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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The traditional bulk mail market can be thought of as serving business communication needs 
with other businesses and customers, and includes transactional and advertising mail, as 
distinct from single piece mail.  Through transactional mail the sender is able to meet its 
obligation of providing information to the recipient (examples including banks’ statements 
and utilities’ invoices).  However, transactional mail can also be seen as one of several 
alternative media for financial institutions to communicate to their customers.  Within this 
wider communications market, the financial institutions can and have started to develop 
internal profit centers in Europe to charge for their transactional activities.  Such centers may 
form only one part of financial institutions’ overall profits and are investigated alongside the 
need for the universal service provider to break even and therefore within a wider 
communications market than just the mails’ market (but not within an even wider context of 
the financial institutions’ overall profits).   
In recent years mail volumes have declined within single piece and bulk mail and while this 
is in part a consequence of the economic downturn, it is also due to the substitution of mail 
by other communication media.  Single piece (SP) mail has been substituted by texting and e-
mail; advertising or direct mail (DM) has been substituted by alternative electronic 
communication; and transactional or non direct mail (NDM) has been substituted by 
statements and invoices conveyed by e-mail or over the internet.  Our particular focus is on 
the senders of NDM-transactional items from financial institutions (which we subsequently 
refer to as ‘banks’) sending statements.   
Following on from previous literature relating to optimal pricing within a global price cap 
and pricing (De Villemeur et al 2002, 2003; De Donder et al. 2006, 2008), in De Donder et 
al. (2011a) we developed a model to look at how a monopoly universal service provider 
(USP) can enhance welfare and break even if it can differentiate between the prices it charges 
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for DM and NDM, where the demand functions for the two segments differ as represented by 
distinct price elasticities, but the marginal costs of the mailings are the same.  We then 
introduced competition from another medium within the DM-advertising segment, and from 
postal entrants accessing the USP’s network downstream and calibrated the model to derive 
illustrative results in terms of welfare and pricing where the DM and NDM price elasticities 
are assumed to differ, in line with empirical evidence. In De Donder et al. (2011b) we 
extended this analysis by looking at the optimal pricing and welfare implications, under 
alternative pricing conditions introduced by business strategies or regulatory constraints, for 
the USP and entrants.  In these papers, and calibrated illustrations reflective of the postal 
sector, the NDM contributed significantly to the recovery of the fixed costs of meeting the 
universal service obligation, through differential pricing between NDM and DM by the USP. 
 
In this paper we look at the effects on welfare and pricing of introducing an electronic 
alternative to the USP’s NDM service.  We proceed with the economic model developed in 
De Donder et al. (2011a and 2011b), with independent mail segments for SP, DM and NDM 
and alternative media competing with DM and NDM.  We focus attention on representative 
senders of NDM, or banks, who are charged an input price by suppliers for the provision of 
transactional services and charge a final price on to their customers, for mail and the 
alternative medium. Our focus throughout is on the impact of an alternative medium to NDM 
on pricing and economic welfare and so, for ease of exposition and unlike De Donder et al 
(2011a and 2011b), we do not introduce the possibility of entrants into the postal market. 
While such an extension would be quite feasible, we consider that it would complicate our 
results without adding much to the insights gained from the development of our earlier 
model.  
 
In our initial analysis we assume that a social planner sets the input (producer) and final 
(consumer) prices to maximize welfare.  Subsequently we analyze the results assuming that 
the banks profit maximize within their profit centers for statements in setting their consumer 
prices in the NDM-transactional segment. We assume banks’ customers switch on price not 
only between paper and electronic statements but also between banks – with the social 
planner then setting other prices for postal products to maximize welfare. Finally, we 
consider the consequences of a binding price cap on the USP’s SP price within the main 
calibrations and some sensitivity analysis. 
 
In Section 2 we summarize the model.  In Section 3 we describe the model calibration used.  
We show the results of our analysis when the social planner sets all prices in Section 4 and 
then in Section 5 when the social planner sets only the USP prices and the banks set their 
prices to maximize profit within their profit centers for statements.  In Section 6 we conclude.   
 
2.  THE MODEL 
 
The universal service provider (USP) provides both single piece mail (SP) and bulk mail 
(BM). We consider two types of BM: direct mail (DM) and non-direct mail (NDM). The 
demands for the three types of mail (SP, DM and NDM) are assumed to be independent from 
each other. 
 
The USP has a de facto monopoly on SP mail and faces the demand function ( )xx p , where x  
stands for SP mail quantity and xp for its unit price. Both types of BM face competition from 
alternative media. We start by describing the market for DM. We denote by Iz the quantity of 
DM sold by the USP, and by zIp its unit price. DM faces the competition of an alternative 
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medium whose unit price is zAp and total quantity Az . Both types of goods are imperfect 
substitutes, so that the demand for the USP’s DM is given by ( , )z zI I Az p p while the demand for 
the alternative medium is ( , )z zA I Az p p . 
 
NDM is transactional mail, and is sold by the USP to intermediaries or banks. These banks 
make use of this product to send information to their final clients.  They also use alternative 
electronic media.  Banks buy NDM from the USP at a unit price of yIp , and alternative 
medium at a unit price of yAp  (which may be nil). Banks then sell both forms of transactional 
media to their own final customers, at consumer prices equal to yIq for mail, and yAq for the 
electronic form. Final customers decide how much of these two imperfect substitutes they 
want to buy. The demand for the USP’s NDM is given by ( , )z zI I Ay q q while the demand for the 
electronic alternative to NDM is ( , )z zA I Ay q q .
2 
 
The USP faces a fixed cost of F , and constant marginal upstream (collection, sorting) and 
downstream (delivery) costs of, respectively, xc  and xd  for SP and Ic and Id  for (the two 
types of) BM. The unit cost of the alternative medium to DM is denoted by zc , and for the 
electronic alternative to NDM by yc . 
 
To sum up, the profit function of the USP is given by 
 
     ( ) ( , ) ( , )z z z y y yI x x x x I I I I I A I I I I I Ap c d x p p c d z p p p c d y q q F            
 
while the profit function for the transactional services of a bank (as a representative sender of 
NDM) is given by 
    ( , ) ( , ).y y y y y y y yB I I I I A A A A I Aq p y q q q p y q q      
 
In section 4, the social planner sets all producer and consumer prices to maximize welfare. In 
section 5, banks choose their profit-maximizing consumer prices ( yIq ,
y
Aq ) as a function of (
y
Ip , yAp ), and the planner anticipates this move when setting its prices. Moreover, we make 
explicit that the extent to which banks are able to charge a mark-up over these input costs 
when pricing transactional media depends on the degree of competition in the banking sector, 
measured by the number of banks. We attain this objective by modeling the market for 
transactional media as a Cournot game between n banks (see Appendix). Since the modeling 
of the whole banking sector is beyond the scope of this paper, we take a partial equilibrium 
approach, assuming that all (price and non-price) determinants of the demand for 
transactional media used by banks are exogenously set and constant, so that we concentrate 
on how ( yIq ,
y
Aq ) affects this demand. In all cases, we impose that the USP breaks even.  
 
3.  CALIBRATION 
 
Both our model and initial calibrations are the same as those of De Donder et al. (2011a and 
2011b), which applied linear demand functions and commenced from a monopoly USP.  The 
assumptions are not from a particular postal operator, but are reflective, in our view, of the 
general nature of postal markets and cost structures found in published empirical studies. 
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As in our previous studies in De Donder et al. (2011a and 2011b) we commence from the 
hypothetical situation where the USP faces no competition. The USP sets a price xp  of €0.50 
for the single piece product and a price of €0.40 for DM ( zIp ) and NDM (
y
Ip ). Total 
quantities sold at those prices are 2x  billion, 2Iz  billion and 6Iy  billion items, 
respectively. The direct own price elasticities are -0.2 for single piece, -1.0 for DM and -0.2 
for NDM.3 We calibrate linear demands based on these quantities, prices and elasticities.  
 
We need further information to calibrate the demand functions for DM and NDM products 
when one alternative medium competes with DM and another alternative medium competes 
with NDM. We use two types of information: the extent of entry for different price 
configurations and the substitutability between the products within the DM-advertising 
segment and the NDM-transactional segment (which ultimately includes the products of the 
USP and an alternative medium in both market segments).  For DM, we define the 
measurement unit for the alternative medium such that one "item" of alternative medium 
refers to the quantity of this medium that is necessary to have the same response rate as one 
item of DM.4 We then assume that the alternative medium's market share is 25% if 50% 
cheaper than the USP and 35% if 75% cheaper than the USP. For NDM, we assume one item 
of the alternative medium corresponds to one item of mail.  We do not have data to calibrate 
the switching between the USP and alternative medium and so illustrate by reference to the 
prices to final customers, yIq  and 
y
Aq , such that the alternative medium's market share is 20% 
if yIq  and 
y
Aq  are both zero (e.g. if the banks do not charge for the mail or internet item) and 
40% when yIq =€0.40 and 
y
Aq  is zero (e.g. if the banks charge the initial calibrated price of the 
USP for each mail item and zero for each item of the alternative electronic medium).  On 
substitution, we assume the displacement ratio of mail transferring to the alternative medium 
in NDM or DM is 0.9.5  Thereby, the USP products and alternative medium are assumed to be 
imperfect substitutes. 
 
The USP unit upstream cost is equal to €0.18 for SP ( xc ) and €0.12 ( Ic ) for the mail items in 
DM and NDM. 6 The USP delivery cost is €0.12 for all mail items ( x Id d ). Hence the end-
to-end unit costs are the same for the USP's mail products in DM and NDM. The value of the 
fixed costs, F , equals €1.680bn so that the USP breaks even in the hypothetical monopoly 
situation (without any alternative media). We assume the cost of the alternative medium for 
DM, zc , is €0.20 per item and, for simplicity, zero for NDM ( yc ).  
 
These assumptions determine the linear demand functions and costs for the calibrated model 
consistent with the analytical presentation in this paper. 
 
 
4.  RESULTS WHEN THE SOCIAL PLANNER SETS ALL OF THE PRICES 
 
We set out below the results of the calibrated model, starting with the case developed in De 
Donder et al (2011b) with an alternative medium introduced for DM but without a NDM 
alternative medium.  In Table 1 we show the results where the social planner is assumed to 
set all of the producer and consumer prices to maximize welfare subject to the USP breaking 
even and discuss this further below.   
 
USP with different prices in DM and NDM and competition to DM from an alternative 
medium 
 
 5 
 
The first column of figures in Table 1 reflects the results shown in De Donder et al. (2011b) 
for the second-best (Ramsey) solution7 with differentiated prices yIp  and
z
Ip and competition 
in DM from an alternative medium.  The USP charges €0.539 for SP, €0.431 for NDM and 
€0.274 for DM with the price of the DM alternative medium assumed to be €0.200.  The USP 
breaks even reasonably easily with a value for the Lagrange multiplier of the USP profit-
constraint of 0.107 and with the profit contributions of €0.470bn for SP, €1.128bn for NDM 
and €0.082bn for DM offset by the fixed cost of €1.68bn.  The NDM product makes the 
largest single contribution to break even for the USP, and this is also reflected in it providing 
the most significant contribution to net consumer surplus.  Consequently, NDM features 
prominently in the welfare analysis and financial position of the USP. 
 
Competition to NDM from an alternative medium with producer and consumer prices 
equal for mail  
 
The second column of figures shows the second best prices when there are alternative media 
to both DM and NDM  and the banks’ consumer price ( yIq ) and the producer price (
y
Ip ) are 
the same in the mails segment of NDM (such that yIq =
y
Ip ).  This is akin to a form of 
regulation on the banks that limits the resale price for mail to be the same as that charged to it 
by the USP.  The SP price ( xp ) and NDM prices ( yIq ,
y
Ip ) are higher (and DM prices the 
same).  The Lagrange multiplier of the USP break-even constraint is also higher at 0.189 as 
the introduction of the NDM alternative medium makes it more difficult for the USP to break 
even.  Nevertheless the USP breaks even, the banks make a total profit of €0.456bn, and both 
consumer surplus and welfare increase in the presence of the NDM alternative medium for 
our calibration.8 
 
We also observe that, within the NDM segment, the consumer price, yAq  (at 0.230€), is more 
than the producer price, yAp  (equal to the marginal cost at zero)
 9, even though the selling of 
the NDM medium alternative does not bring revenue to the USP. The positive price of yAq  is 
related to efficiency (since yIq  is pushed above marginal cost in order to recover fixed costs, 
the planner also increases yAq  in order not to distort too much the choice between goods Iy
and Ay ), so that the social planner marks up the marginal costs when setting consumer prices 
for both NDM and the NDM alternative medium. 
 
In addition to the results shown in Table 1, we also considered the effect of an additional 
constraint where not only the banks’ consumer price ( yIq ) and the producer price (
y
Ip ) are the 
same for NDM, but also the banks’ consumer price ( yAq ) and the producer price (
y
Ap ) are the 
same for the NDM alternative medium.  In this instance, the outcome is the same (as the 
second column of figures in Table 1) other than yAp =
y
Aq  so that the banks make zero profit 
and its previous profit of €0.456bn transfers to the provider of the NDM alternative medium.   
 
Table 1: Calibrated results for the USP without and then with an NDM alternative medium 
      With NDM medium alternative 
    Differentiated 
NDM/DM 
prices, without 
NDM medium 
alternative 
Second best 
outcome, with 
additional 
constraint of 
y
Ip =
y
Iq  
Second best 
outcome, with a 
banks’ non‐
negative profit 
constraint 
Second best 
outcome, with a 
banks’ zero profit 
constraint, with 
greater market 
share held by 
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alternative 
medium 
Prices (Є):           
Single piece  xp   0.539  0.670  0.558  0.656 
NDM – Mail ‐ USP  y
Ip   0.431  0.455  0.498  0.596 
NDM – Mail ‐ Banks   y
Iq   ‐  0.455  0.405  0.321 
NDM – Medium – Alternative  y
Ap   ‐  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NDM – Medium ‐ Banks   y
Aq   ‐  0.230  0.219  0.181 
DM – Mail ‐ USP  z
Ip   0.274  0.274  0.272  0.272 
DM – Medium – Alternative  z
Ap   0.200  0.200  0.200  0.200 
Quantities (bn):           
Single piece  x   1.969  1.864  1.953  1.875 
NDM – Mail – USP 
Iy   5.907  4.051  4.255  2.631 
DM – Mail – USP 
Iz   2.383  2.255  2.398  2.400 
Sub‐Total    10.259  8.170  8.606  6.906 
NDM – Medium 
Ay   ‐  1.983  1.917  4.008 
DM – Medium 
Az   0.272  0.309  0.268  0.268 
Total    10.531  10.462  10.791  11.182 
Contribution to fixed cost – 
USP (Єbn): 
         
Single piece    0.470  0.690  0.504  0.667 
NDM    1.128  0.870  1.099  0.936 
DM    0.082  0.120  0.077  0.076 
Total USP profit (Єbn):    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Medium – Alternative     ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Bank    ‐  0.456  0.000  0.000 
Sum of profits (Єbn):    0.000  0.456  0.000  0.000 
Consumer surplus (Єbn)           
Single piece    2.423  2.171  2.385  2.198 
NDM    5.816  6.364  6.616  10.463 
DM    0.708  0.664  0.713  0.714 
Total    8.947  9.199  9.714  13.376 
           
Welfare (Єbn)    8.947  9.654  9.714  13.376 
Lagrange multiplier    0.107  0.189  0.099  0.098 
 
 
Competition to NDM from an alternative medium with breakeven constraint for the 
representative bank 
 
The third column of figures shows the second-best prices when there are alternative media to 
both DM and NDM and where we lift the constraint that yIp = yIq  while ensuring that the 
banks’ profits (as well as the USP’s profit) are non negative.  For the banks to break even, the 
social planner sets prices so that the banks subsidize NDM (with yIq  less than
y
Ip ) at the 
expense of the NDM alternative medium (with yAq  more than
y
Ap ).  Recall that
y
Ip  does not 
affect allocative efficiency, only USP’s financial position, and that yAp  is not set by the USP 
but equals zero.  In the first best scenario, consumer prices equate to marginal cost, and yIp
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may be set at its marginal cost of €0.24.  When the USP is required to break even, but the 
banks are not, yIp  increases above 
y
Iq , with the latter remaining set at marginal cost.
10  When 
the banks and USP are both required to breakeven, the banks profit from yAq >
y
Ap =0 and the 
social planner looks to reduce yIq to increase mail volumes and increase
y
Ip to contribute to the 
USP’s break even with the banks profit in the NDM alternative medium being offset by the 
banks loss in NDM.  The fact that yIq <
y
Ip  while 
y
Aq >
y
Ap  comes from the asymmetry 
between the two goods in terms of the USP break even constraint - the USP is not involved in 
the selling of Ay  so that it does not affect its break even while for Iy  the social planner has 
an incentive to both lower the consumer price ( yIq , to stimulate demand) and to increase the 
producer price ( yIp ) to increase the USP’s per item revenue.  
 
When compared to the second column of figures, the additional degree of freedom given to 
the USP allows it to increase the contribution of NDM towards recovering its fixed cost while 
decreasing both the prices for DM and SP; the constraint that xp is not less than yIp + 0.06€ is 
binding. The Lagrange multiplier is also lower at 0.099 as it is easier for the USP to break 
even. The banks can charge less for both their services in the NDM-transactional segment 
and still break even, and the USP can charge more for its NDM service without reducing 
demand as this is determined by the banks’ consumer price.  Total volumes, consumer 
surplus and welfare all increase with the NDM medium alternative for our calibration.11 
 
The fourth column of figures shows the second-best prices under the same assumptions other 
than that there is a greater preference and market share for the NDM alternative medium.  We 
assume that the alternative medium's market share is 50% if yIq  and 
y
Aq  are both zero (e.g. if 
the banks do not charge for the mail or internet item) and 70% when yIq =0.40€ and 
y
Aq  is 
zero (e.g. if the banks charge the initial calibrated price of the USP for each mail item and 
zero for each item over the internet).  Comparing the fourth column with the third column of 
figures in Table 1, the USP’s share of the NDM market segment falls from 69% to 40% as 
demand transfers to the alternative medium.  The social planner increases USP prices xp and
y
Ip , and reduces 
y
Iq such that the banks make a greater loss in NDM.  However, this loss is 
offset by a lower price and greater volume in the NDM alternative medium.  While the SP 
consumer surplus reduces with the rise in SP price, the consumer surplus for the NDM-
transactional segment increases with the reductions in consumer prices and the change in 
calibration.  There are relatively small changes in DM-advertising such that its consumer 
surplus remains largely unaffected. Overall, the USP continues to break even and its ease in 
doing so remains similar to that with a lower market share for the alternative medium (with a 
Lagrange multiplier of 0.098).  Hence, when the social planner sets the second-best prices 
within our calibrations and there is a greater preference and market share for the NDM 
alternative medium, it benefits customers in the NDM-transactional segment at the expense 
of SP customers, with negligible effect on the USP’s ability to reach breakeven. 
 
Implications when the social planner sets all of the prices 
 
In each second-best case when the social planner sets all of the prices, the producer price for 
NDM exceeds that for DM, as was the case in De Donder et al (2011b).  Indeed, the presence 
of competition from an alternative medium increases the price differential between NDM and 
DM for the USP.   
 
 8 
 
The consumer price for NDM ( yIq ) is also greater than its marginal cost and the consumer 
price for the NDM alternative medium ( yAq ) also increases above its (zero) marginal costs.   
The market distortion in one good (from the mark-up over marginal costs for yIq due to the 
fixed cost associated with meeting the USO in the mail market) causes a market distortion in 
the price of substitute good yAq .  Hence, for efficiency reasons, a value of
y
Iq above marginal 
cost is accompanied by a value of yAq  also above marginal cost in second-best settings - a 
result that is common to all the second-best cases considered in this paper. 
 
When the social planner sets the second-best prices to maximize welfare subject to the USP 
breaking even and the consumer and producer prices to be equal in NDM (in the second set 
of figures in Table 1), we observe the banks make a profit and the USP has greater financial 
difficulties in the presence of the NDM medium alternative.  However, when the social 
planner sets the second-best prices to maximize welfare (without constraining producer prices 
to equate to consumer prices) subject to the USP and banks breaking even (in the third and 
fourth set of figures in Table 1), the banks use their charge for the NDM alternative medium 
to subsidize their mail activity and enhance welfare - when the marginal cost of the 
alternative medium is sufficiently low (or, as we assume it to be zero) - and the USP finds it 
easier to break even because the lower consumer price increases volumes.  
 
The second best optimal prices without a constraint that consumer prices for NDM be equal 
to producer prices appear preferable to a resale price constraint in NDM (that is, yIq = 
y
Ip ) not 
only in terms of welfare but also for the USP in terms of financial ease in break even, within 
the calibrations used.  Nevertheless it may not be feasible for a social planner to set all of 
these prices on behalf of the banks and USP.  Consequently we consider in the next Section 
cases when the banks are able to set the consumer prices in order to profit maximize within 
their profit centers for statements.     
 
5.  RESULTSWHEN THE SOCIAL PLANNER SETS ONLY MAIL PRODUCT 
PRICES AND BANKS PROFIT MAXIMISE 
 
In our second set of results, in Table 2, we assume that the banks maximize profits within 
their profit centers for statements by setting of the consumer prices while the social planner 
anticipates this reaction when setting the prices for the postal products to maximize welfare.  
As discussed in Sections 2 and 3, we analyze banks as profit maximizers competing for the 
transactional services in a Cournot game and we assume that there are a number of n banks 
(of 10 or infinity) who set the consumer prices ( yIq ,
y
Aq ).   We then consider the same model 
but with the addition of a price cap on the SP price.   
 
Competition to NDM from an alternative medium with Cournot pricing by the banks 
 
In the first two columns of Table 2 we show the results consistent with the original 
assumption of the market share held by alternative medium.  When the number of banks 
increases, the banks reduce their consumer prices ( yIq ,
y
Aq ) relative to their corresponding 
producer prices ( yIp ,
y
Ap ), and profit levels decrease to zero when the industry moves to a 
competitive fringe (n=infinity).   Meanwhile, the social planner seeks to minimize the adverse 
effect on welfare of the banks’ ability to charge higher consumer price in mail ( yIq ) for lower 
n by reducing the producer price ( yIp ).  The lower producer price (
y
Ip ) makes it more 
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difficult for the USP to break even and the value of the Lagrange multiplier of the USP break 
even constraint and prices in SP and DM ( xp and zIp  respectively) increase. 
 
We again observe, as in Section 4, the consumer price for the NDM alternative medium ( yAq ) 
in each case is less than the consumer price for mail ( yIq ) and each is above their respective 
marginal costs. This is a feature of second-best outcomes when the revenue from selling one 
good (NDM) contributes towards recovering the USP fixed cost while the other (NDM 
alternative medium) does not. 
 
The consumer prices ( yIq and 
y
Aq ) decrease as the banks’ market power decreases with higher 
n and they apply a lower mark-up over marginal costs. For the alternative medium to NDM, 
the marginal cost is zero so that yAq  decreases with higher n. For NDM, the banks’ marginal 
cost (which equals producer price) yIp is controlled by the social planner. Anticipating a lower 
mark-up on yIq , the social planner sets a higher 
y
Ip   (since there is less need to keep 
y
Ip  low 
in order to prevent the banks from setting yIq  too high). We then have a smaller mark-up on 
y
Ip  and lower
y
Iq  as n increases. Hence the direct effect of a larger n (a smaller mark-up on 
the banks' marginal cost yIp ) is greater than the indirect effect (the social planner reacts by 
increasing yIp ), resulting in lower consumer prices
y
Iq and
y
Aq  and enhanced welfare.  
 
In fact, the social planner faces a conflict as it tries both to induce consumer prices yIq  and 
y
Aq  which do not distort too much the relative market shares between the two goods (for 
productive efficiency) and to drive the producer prices down towards marginal costs (for 
allocative efficiency). The consumer prices ( yIq and 
y
Aq ) diverge as the mark ups decline.  
When n is infinite (a competitive fringe), the banks have no market power, such that yIq =
y
Ip  
and yAq =
y
Ap . The social planner controls
y
Ip but not 
y
Ap , which is set exogenously (by banks' 
providers of electronic services) to zero (and zAp  is set to €0.20). In this limit case, 0yAq  , 
while yIq >0.  The social planner would like to increase 
y
Ap  from zero, increase 
y
Ip and 
decrease xp . The large gap between yAq  and 
y
Iq with a large n is then caused by
y
Aq  being 
constrained to be zero.  
 
Hence, greater competition in the banking sector for transactional statements reduces the 
financial pressure on the USP and increases welfare in the presence of a NDM medium 
alternative.   Conversely, mark ups and profit for the banks from transactional statements 
increase with lower n, and cause the USP greater financial pressures.  While the USP charges 
lower prices for NDM, its prices for SP and DM increase and overall consumer surplus and 
welfare reduces.   
Table 2:  Calibrated results for the USP with an NDM alternative medium and profit 
maximizing of transactional statements by the banks 
    Number of banks with original 
assumption of the market share 
held by alternative medium 
Number of banks, with greater 
market share held by alternative 
medium 
    n=10  n=infinity  n=10  n=infinity  
Prices (Є):           
Single piece  xp   0.884  0.818  1.082  1.047 
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NDM – Mail ‐ USP  y
Ip   0.390  0.406  0.391  0.400 
NDM – Mail ‐ Banks  y
Iq   0.573  0.406  0.574  0.400 
NDM – Medium – Alternative  y
Ap   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
NDM – Medium ‐ Banks   y
Aq   0.243  0.000  
0.367  0.000 
DM – Mail ‐ USP  z
Ip   0.324  0.315  0.353  0.348 
DM – Medium – Alternative  z
Ap   0.200  0.200  0.200  0.200 
Quantities (bn):           
Single piece  x   1.693  1.745  1.535  1.562 
NDM – Mail – USP12 
Iy   3.456  3.718  1.798  1.936 
DM – Mail – USP 
Iz   2.250  2.516  1.857  1.891 
Sub‐Total    7.399  7.979  5.190  5.389 
NDM – Medium 
Ay   2.250  2.516  4.091  4.516 
DM – Medium 
Az   0.368  0.350  0.422  0.413 
Total    9.684  10.440  9.703  10.318 
Contribution to fixed cost – 
USP (Єbn): 
         
Single piece    0.989  0.905  1.200  1.167 
NDM    0.519  0.617  0.271  0.309 
DM    0.172  0.158  0.209  0.203 
Total USP profit (Єbn):    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Medium – Alternative     ‐  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
Bank    1.178  0.000  1.830  0.000 
Sum of profit (Єbn):    1.178  0.000  1.830  0.000 
Consumer surplus (Єbn)           
Single piece    1.791  1.904  1.472  1.526 
NDM    5.891  7.069  9.149  11.053 
DM    0.598  0.618  0.542  0.552 
Total    8.280  9.590  11.163  13.130 
           
Welfare (Єbn)    9.459  9.590  12.993  13.130 
Lagrange multiplier    0.381  0.312  0.688  0.619 
 
In the final two columns of Table 2 (and as in Table 1), we show the impact of a greater 
preference by consumers and thus market share for the alternative medium.13  The USP 
increases all its prices to recover its costs with the banks charging a similar price for mail ( yIq
), but higher price for the alternative medium ( yAq ).  While the USP breaks even it has 
significantly greater difficulty in doing so.  Meanwhile the banks raise greater profits at a 
lower n.  Hence, when there is a greater preference and market share for the NDM alternative 
medium, this benefits the banks and NDM-transactional customers at the expense of SP and 
DM-advertising customers, and makes it more difficult for the USP to break even. 
When compared to the results in Table 1, the profit maximizing behavior of the banks causes 
the USP greater financial difficulty and the SP price rises.  Consequently we consider the 
case where the USP’s SP price xp is capped at €0.75, and binding within our calibrations. 
Competition to NDM from an alternative medium, with Cournot pricing by the banks 
and a price cap on single piece mail. 
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When we introduce a price cap of €0.75 on xp , the USP prices ( yIp ,
z
Ip ) and consumer price 
for NDM ( yIq ) increase, while the other prices (
y
Ap ,
y
Aq and 
z
Ap ) are unaffected.  In fact, the 
cap on SP causes the consumer prices in both DM-Advertising and NDM-transactional to 
increase, with the exception of yAq (which is a function of n and of 
y
Ap  (=0) only).   
 
With the price cap on SP, the consumer prices yAq  and 
y
Iq  remain decreasing in n, but
y
Ip  
decreases in n (whereas, as reported in Table 2, yIp  increased in n without the cap on
xp ). The 
price cap causes the USP greater financial difficulty in breaking even, as reflected in higher 
values of the Lagrange multiplier, and higher price yIp  relative to those in Table 2. The social 
planner would still like to charge a lower yIp to offset higher consumer prices for lower n, but 
the need for the USP to break even overrides this and leads to increases in yIp relative to those 
in Table 2.  We also observe that yIp rises more than
z
Ip , because of the difference in price 
elasticity, thereby increasing the price differential between NDM and DM. 
 
The increase in yIq leads to lower consumer surplus and welfare with the introduction of the 
cap on xp .  The price cap leads to an increase in consumer surplus for SP and reduction in 
consumer surplus for the NDM-transactional and DM-advertising segments.  The net effect is 
a reduction in welfare which is greater where the cap acts as a more significant constraint; 
that is, when n is low. 
 
When we extend this further and assume a greater preference and market share for the 
alternative medium,14 the USP looks to increase all its prices but fails to break even for each 
n.  The banks set higher consumer prices ( yIq and 
y
Aq ) to maintain a constant share for NDM 
on the NDM-transactional segment and the scale of the banks profit exceeds the USP’s loss 
for n in excess of 10, but less then infinity - raising the possibility of part of the banks’ profit 
being used to help fund the USP’s loss. 
 
6.    CONCLUSIONS 
 
Financial institutions might look to make statement information profit centers for their 
businesses.  While there are some social obstacles to implementing such an approach, with 
customers used to access to information without any charge, the charging of statements is 
beginning and may continue.  In this paper we have looked at the implications of such 
institutions paying USPs and an alternative medium for the provision of such services, and 
recharging them to the customer. 
 
Our focus has been on the NDM-transactional segment where there is imperfect competition 
between paper statements delivered by the USP and electronic statements provided by an 
electronic alternative.   We have looked at this through an extension to the economic model 
of De Donder et al. (2011a and 2011b) by focusing on the welfare and pricing implications of 
imperfect competition between the USP and alternative media in NDM-transactional and 
DM-advertising.  In each case, the USP continues to differentiate the prices of its NDM and 
DM services to reflect different price elasticities assumed for the two markets. 
 
In section 4, we considered the case where a social planner sets the producer and consumer 
prices (other than those assumed to be constant) to maximize welfare.  When only the USP is 
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assumed to break even, the banks activities might not be profitable.  If the banks charge a 
resale price for paper statements equal to the producer price from the USP, then the banks 
might be profitable provided that the sale of their electronic statements is priced above its 
marginal cost.  However, within our calibrations, it is welfare enhancing for the social 
planner to set consumer prices differing from producer prices and such that both the USP and 
banks breakeven.  In this case the profits to the banks from the electronic statements 
subsidize a lower consumer price (stimulating growth) and a loss to the banks for paper 
statements.   
 
Subsequently, in section 5, we considered the case where the banks profit maximize in setting 
their consumer prices in the NDM-transactional market - using mark ups of producer prices (
y
Ip , yAp ) to consumer prices (
y
Iq ,
y
Aq ) determined by the degree of competition assumed for the 
n banks’ transactional services – with the social planner then setting other prices for postal 
products to maximize welfare.  In the absence of any price cap on SP, the USP is able to 
break even, within our calibrations, but with lower consumer surplus and welfare than before.  
In the presence of a price cap on SP, the USP is under greater financial pressure and not able 
to break even when the calibrations are amended to reflect a greater preference and market 
share for the electronic medium, while the banks make substantial profits from charging their 
customers for transactional services.  In such circumstance, where banks charge their 
customers for transactional services and rely on the USP’s network for provision of their mail 
services and there is a public policy objective to limit the price of SP, part of the banks’ profit 
from transactional statements might be used to help fund the deficit to the USP.   
 
We conclude that the introduction of an alternative medium for NDM, in addition to DM, has 
the potential to enhance welfare, if the USP and banks' profit centers relating to statements 
could be regulated to breakeven. Alternatively, if the banks profit maximize its profit centers 
for statements, then it might lead to increased financial pressure on the USP, and particularly 
so if there is either a binding price cap regulation on the USP or significant changes in 
customer behavior in switching to an electronic medium.  This could result in the USP being 
unable to breakeven at which point some means of funding the universal service provision 
would need to be considered.  Within our model, there is no scope to raise funds through 
charging postal entrants, but there could be scope to raise funds through general taxation, 
taxation on the banks’ relevant profit centers from transactional statements or through 
charges for the alternative electronic medium – though not currently envisaged within the 
current (Third) European Postal Services Directive. This brings to the fore the consideration 
of public policy and the balance of choices between the consumer demand for the universal 
service and associated fixed costs of the USP, the incentives and profit maximizing behavior 
of the banks and the consumer demand for and development of the alternative electronic 
medium. 
 
NOTE 
 
1The analysis contained in this paper reflects the view of the authors and may not necessarily be those of Royal 
Mail Group. 
2 The demand for transactional media is actually a derived demand, since transactional media are used as inputs 
by banks. As explained below in the text, we assume that all determinants of this demand other than 
transactional media prices are held constant, so that we can concentrate on how the demand for transactional 
media is affected by the price of NDM and its electronic substitutes. 
3These values are broadly in line, as approximations, with the empirical literature in this area (see, for example, 
Veruete-McKay et al, 2011). 
4So, if the alternative medium is email, and if the response rate of prospective customers to email is, say, 20 
times less than for DM, then one item of alternative medium corresponds to 20 emails. 
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5This means that nine out of ten items of the alternative medium are displaced BM mail (either DM or NDM as 
relevant) from the USP, while one in ten are additional volumes created in the sector. 
6We add a price constraint that xp is not less than yIp + 0.06€. 
7 This corresponds to the prices which maximize total welfare in the economy (measured as the sum of 
consumer surpluses and firms' profits) under the constraint that the USP breaks even. See De Donder et al 
(2011b) for the formal statement. 
8Alternative pricing constraints relating to y could be applied such that yIq =
y
Aq or 
y
Aq =
y
Ap , where the banks 
make negative profit, or yIp =
y
Ap (=0) where Iy is close to zero within the calibrations.  Hence these 
alternatives are not pursued further. 
9An increase in the producer price, yAp , transfers the profit of the banks to the provider of the NDM medium 
alternative when in the range (0, yAq ).  Hence the level of the producer price of the alternative medium in NDM 
only has a distributional effect in allocating the total profit between the banks and provider of the alternative 
medium. 
10If the only constraint were rather for the banks to break even, we would get yIp <
y
Iq . 
11We also considered the effect of an increase in the marginal cost of the alternative medium in NDM above 
zero.  This makes it more difficult for the banks to break even.  Consequently, the banks increase their consumer 
prices.  The USP also increases its prices as the total volumes fall and it finds it more difficult to break even. 
12We report total quantities across the n banks, hence the uppercase symbols IY  and AY --see Appendix.
  
13The alternative medium's market share is 50% if yIq  and 
y
Aq  are both zero (e.g. if the banks do not charge for 
the mail or internet item) and 70% when yIq =€0.40 and 
y
Aq  is zero. 
14 ibid footnote 13. 
 
 
APPENDIX: COURNOT COMPETITION BETWEEN BANKS 
 
In section 5, we consider the following two stage procedure. In the first stage, the USP 
chooses optimally the producer prices xp , yIp , zIp . In the second stage, n banks compete à la 
Cournot - i.e., each bank simultaneously sets its quantity (of both NDM mail and its 
alternative medium) in order to maximize its profit, given the quantities chosen by the other 
n-1 firms. Observe that this implies that some final consumers switch from one bank to 
another when transactional media prices vary between banks. As usual, we solve the game by 
backward induction - i.e., we assume that the USP perfectly anticipates the Cournot game 
result when setting its optimal prices. 
 
To model this situation, we proceed to the following change of notation: there are n identical 
banks, and each bank is represented by the index i=1,2,...n. We denote by iIy  (resp., iAy ) the 
quantity of NDM (resp., of alternative medium) sold by bank i. We denote by IY  (resp., AY ) 
the total quantity of NDM (resp., of alternative medium) sold by the n banks, that is:  
1 1
and  .n ni iI I A Ai iY y Y y     
The inverse demand function for these two goods is then given by 
( , ) and ( , ).y yI I A A I Aq Y Y q Y Y  
 
The profit of bank i is given by  
( , ) ( , ) ,i y y i y y iB I I A I I A I A A Aq Y Y p y q Y Y p y            
with total banks' profit given by 
1
n
i
B B
i


  and the equilibrium of the Cournot game solving  
,
max  for all 1,2,... .
i i
I A
i
By y
i n   
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Finally, note that, since we have assumed identical banks, we have that iI IY ny  and iA AY ny  
(i.e., each bank sells the same amount of NDM and of its alternative medium). 
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